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Review of Labor and Employment Decisions
from the United States Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 Term
(25 ABA J of Labor and Empl Law 107-158 (2010))
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt*
Todd Dvorak**
I.

Introduction

In its most recently completed Term, the United States Supreme Court decided eight
labor and employment law cases of some consequence. The decided cases covered a broad array
of labor and employment subjects, including: the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), public sector labor law, and private sector labor law. Practitioners
who specialize in a particular area might be tempted to focus on only the cases in their area.
Academics might be tempted to try to devise some economic or logical theory that ties together
these diverse decisions. However, after even modest reflection, it is apparent that the best way to
understand the underlying dynamics of the Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 Term with respect to
labor and employment law cases is to consider the voting patterns of the individual justices and
the Court’s overall vote in each case.
The labor and employment law decisions from the Court’s 2008–2009 Term might be
divided into two categories: “broad consensus” cases, which are decided by at least a 6-3 vote of
the justices, and “close cases,” which are decided by a bare 5-4 vote. Even though a 6-3 vote
indicates significant disagreement among the justices, we might call it a “broad consensus” in
that, as we will see, a six-vote majority includes at least one justice from both the liberal and
conservative wings of the Court. It is very revealing to first divide the Court’s decisions in this
fashion and then arrange the decisions and the votes of the justices chronologically. Although
the insight gained from this exercise will not surprise followers of the Court, even dedicated
students of the Court will be impressed by its predictability in deciding the labor and
employment law cases this last Term.
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TABLE OF CASES
Broad Consensus Cases
Case
Locke
v.
Karass,
129 S. Ct. 798
(2009).

Kennedy
v.
Plan Administrator
for DuPont Savings
and Investment
Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865
(2009).
Crawford
v.
Metropolitan
Government of
Nashville and
Davidson County,
Tennessee, 129 S.
Ct. 846 (2009).
Ysursa
v.
Pocatello Education
Ass’n,
129 S. Ct. 1093
(2009).

AT&T Corp.
v.
Hulteen,
129 S. Ct. 1962
(2009).

Issue / Outcome
The First Amendment permits local
unions to consider national litigation
expenses as a chargeable cost in
nonmember service fees, as long as the
expenses are “appropriately related to
collective bargaining” and “reciprocal
in nature.”
Union wins.
A plan administrator complies with
ERISA by distributing benefits in
accordance with the directives of plan
documents, even when such benefits
have been waived according to
common law waiver doctrine.
Employer wins.
Title VII protects employees who are
interviewed during their employers’
internal investigations about
allegations of sexual harassment.
Employee wins.

Vote / Opinion Authors
Decided 9-0, January 21, 2009
Unanimous: Breyer
Concurrence: Roberts (joined
by Scalia)

Idaho’s ban on payroll deductions for
political activities, as it applied to local
government employers, does not
infringe unions’ First Amendment
rights, because the State’s decision not
to promote speech furthers its rational
interest in separating the operation of
government from partisan politics.
Union loses.

Decided 6-3, February 24,
2009
Majority: Roberts (joined by
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito; joined in part by
Ginsburg)
Concurrence: Ginsburg (in part
and in the judgment)
Concurrence/Dissent: Breyer
Dissent: Stevens
Dissent: Souter
Decided 7-2, May 18, 2009
Majority: Souter (joined by
Roberts, Stevens, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito)
Concurrence: Stevens
Dissent: Ginsburg (joined by
Breyer)

An employer’s bona fide seniority
system does not violate Title VII, even
where the system allows for
differential treatment that has been
subsequently deemed unlawful.
Employer wins.
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Decided 9-0, January 26, 2009
Unanimous: Souter

Decided 9-0, January 26, 2009
Majority: Souter (joined by
Roberts, Stevens, Scalia,
Kennedy, Ginsburg, and
Breyer)
Concurrence: Alito (joined by
Thomas)

Close Cases
Case
14 Penn Plaza LLC
v.
Pyett,
129 S. Ct. 1456
(2009).

Issue/ Outcome
A collective bargaining agreement that
clearly and unmistakably requires
employees to arbitrate individual
claims under the ADEA is enforceable.
Employer wins.

Gross
v.
FBL Financial
Services, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 2343
(2009).

Under the ADEA, the burden of proof
never shifts from plaintiff to employer
in a mixed-motive discrimination case.
Furthermore, in order for a plaintiff to
prove discrimination under the ADEA,
it must show that age was a “but for”
factor in the employer’s decision to
take adverse action.
Employer wins.
Before employers can engage in
intentional, race-conscious
discrimination for purposes of avoiding
or remedying a disparate impact, Title
VII requires them to have a “strong
basis in evidence” to believe that they
will be subject to disparate-impact
liability for failing to take such
discriminatory action.
Employee wins.

Ricci
v.
DeStefano,
129 S. Ct. 2658
(2009).

Vote
Decided 5-4, April 1, 2009
Majority: Thomas (joined by
Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Alito)
Dissent: Stevens
Dissent: Souter (joined by
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer)
Decided 5-4, June 18, 2009
Majority: Thomas (joined by
Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Alito)
Dissent: Stevens (joined by
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer)
Dissent: Breyer (joined by
Souter and Ginsburg)
Decided 5-4, June 29, 2009
Majority: Kennedy (joined by
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito)
Concurrence: Alito (joined by
Scalia and Thomas)
Dissent: Ginsburg (joined by
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer)

Two observations are apparent after even a cursory review of this table of cases. First,
with a modest exception for AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, the least controversial cases were decided
first. All three of the unanimous opinions were handed down in January, followed by Ysursa v.
Pocatello Education Ass’n (a 6-3 decision) in February, AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen (a 7-2 decision)
decided in May, and then the three 5-4 “close cases” decided in April and June. Indeed, perhaps
the most controversial employment law decision, Ricci v. DeStefano, was handed down the very
last day of the Court’s Term. Second, in all of the close cases, the majority consisted of Justice
Kennedy joining the more conservative wing of the Court, consisting of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito. This combination of justices not only composed the
majority in all the close cases, it also was in the majority in all other labor and employment
decisions the Court made this year. For the 2008–2009 Supreme Court Term, there were no
decisions in labor and employment law that did not meet the approval of all of the Court’s five
most conservative judges.
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Justice Kennedy’s importance in forming Supreme Court majority opinions is not unique
to labor and employment law. Since the retirement of Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy has
often been the “man in the middle” between the Court’s ideological wings: the liberal wing
represented by Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg, and the conservative wing
composed of Justices Roberts, Thomas, Scalia, and Alito. Examining all of the seventy-five
cases decided this Term, there were a total of twenty-three 5-4 decisions. Of these twenty-three
cases, Justice Kennedy was the deciding vote in eighteen—or just over seventy-eight percent.1
Indeed, looking at all of the decisions this Term, Justice Kennedy was in the majority ninety-two
percent of the time—far more than any other justice.2 Justice Kennedy’s role as the important
swing vote between the liberal and conservative wings of the Supreme Court almost since the
inception of Chief Justice Roberts’ tenure has led some academics to suggest that “the Roberts
Court” should really be called “the Kennedy Court.”3
A quick review of decisions shows that Justice Kennedy more often votes with the
conservative wing of the Court. Looking at all cases in the 2008–2009 Term, there were sixteen
5-4 decisions, and in eleven of those, Justice Kennedy sided with the four most conservative
justices.4 This performance is consistent with Justice Kennedy’s performance in previous years.5
Justice Kennedy occasionally sides with the liberal wing, particularly on issues of preserving
individual liberties against government intrusion or to preserve past precedents. More often than
not, however, it seems that Justice Kennedy’s views on law and the Constitution coincide with
those of Justices Roberts, Thomas, Scalia, and Alito.
With respect to labor and employment law cases, although Justice Kennedy has
occasionally sided with the liberal wing, he has more often sided with the conservative wing—
and that was clearly the case this last Term. In the 2007–2008 Supreme Court Term, there was
only one 5-4 labor and employment law decision: Kentucky Retirement System v. EEOC.6 In
that case, Justice Kennedy found himself in the minority with the curious combination of Justices
Ginsburg, Scalia, and Alito. The year before that, however, Justice Kennedy sided with the
conservative wing in the Ledbetter7 decision, the Court’s only 5-4 labor and employment law
case of the 2006–2007 Term. Further, the year before that Justice Kennedy sided with the
conservative wing in the Garcetti8 decision in the Court’s only 5-4 labor and employment law
case of the 2005–2006 Term. In the most recent Term, Justice Kennedy’s penchant for siding
1

Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN BAG
2D 413, 414 (2009).
2
Id.
3
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, When It Matters Most, It Is Still The Kennedy Court, 11
GREEN BAG 2D 427 (2008); Charles Whitebread, The Conservative Kennedy Court—What A
Difference A Single Justice Can Make: The 2006–2007 Term of the United States Supreme
Court, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 1 (2007); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court, 9 GREEN BAG
2D 335 (2006); David Cole, The ‘Kennedy Court’, THE NATION, July 31, 2006, at 6.
4
Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 414.
5
See generally, Whitebread, supra note 3.
6
128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008).
7
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
8
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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with the conservative wing seems to have fully blossomed, as he sided with the conservative bloc
in all three of the 5-4 labor and employment law cases for the Term, and indeed he sided with
them in all of the Term’s labor and employment law cases. It seems that on questions of
conflicts between individuals and private employers, or the exercise of collective rights, Justice
Kennedy’s predilections fall in line with those of the conservative wing. Certainly anyone who
is considering appealing a case to the Supreme Court should study very closely Justice
Kennedy’s past opinions to determine whether he or she has any chance of gaining his vote. A
lawyer who represents employees should think doubly hard about this question.
The appointment of Justice Sotomayor to replace Justice Souter does not seem to change
this situation. Basically her appointment just replaces one member of the liberal wing with
another, not changing the Court’s ideological division. Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has argued
that Justice Sotomayor’s different experiences and perspectives may have an impact on how
other justices decide cases—perhaps even Justice Kennedy9— but this remains yet to be seen.
Some research in personnel management suggests that the greatest value of diversity is achieved
by people who connect or flow among various groups rather than strongly identify with just one
group.10 This suggests that a person who strongly identifies as a “latina” may be a poor
consensus builder on the Court, at least in comparison with a similar person who is not so
invested in his or her gender and ethnic identity. At a minimum, it would seem unwise for
Justice Sotomayor to begin her relationship with Justice Kennedy and the other members of the
Court from the perspective that, as a Latina, she has had “richer life experiences” and makes
“better” decisions than a white male.11
If her decisions while on the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York or the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit are an accurate indication,
then Justice Sotomayor’s views on labor and employment law might be described as those of a
garden variety, moderate-liberal Democrat. In her most visible labor opinion, Silverman v.
Major League Baseball Player Relations Commission, 12 then-District Judge Sotomayor held that
issues related to the players’ free agency were mandatory subjects of bargaining, and the
employers’ unilateral changes in these terms warranted the section 10(j) injunctive relief sought
by the National Labor Relations Board.13 The Second Circuit later affirmed this decision, and it
helped end the 1995 baseball strike.14 In her most visible employment law decision, Ricci v.
DeStefano,15 then-Circuit Judge Sotomayor joined a very brief per curiam opinion that affirmed
a district court’s summary judgment order in favor of the employer, concluding that the white
firefighters who objected to the setting aside of the results of an employment test had no viable

9

Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 428.

10

SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS,
SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2008).
11

Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge's Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, at 92 (2002).

880 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 261.
14
See Richard Sandomir, A Baseball Ruling, A Steppingstone To the Top Court, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2009, at B11.
15
530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008).
12
13

5

Title VII claim.16 The reversal of this decision by the Supreme Court was perhaps the Court’s
most visible case of the Term and is discussed at length below.
Beyond these highly visible cases, other opinions of Sotomayor’s that were reviewed by
the authors amount to a respectable resume of labor and employment law cases—but she is not
known as having particular expertise in the subject. More often than not she has voted to uphold
employee and union interests; however, she is not a sure vote for those interests and regularly
sees the employer’s side of the argument. Because of her lack of expertise in the subject and her
modest inclination toward employee and union interests, it seems unlikely that Justice
Sotomayor will take over Justice Souter’s role of writing a disproportionate number of the
consensus labor and employment law cases. That role will perhaps fall to Justice Stevens as the
last remaining moderate Republican currently sitting on the Court.
We turn now to a detailed review of the Supreme Court’s labor and employment law
decisions for the 2008–2009 Term.
II.

Broad Consensus Cases

Even among the decisions that found broad consensus among the Supreme Court
Justices, there were important precedents decided this Term, including two important cases under
antidiscrimination laws.
A.

Title VII Cases
1.

Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County,
Tennessee17
A.

CASE BACKGROUND
(i.)

Issue and Context

The issue in Crawford was whether the opposition clause of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 protects employees who speak out about discrimination when answering questions
as part of an employer’s internal investigation.18 The opposition clause forbids an employer
from retaliating “against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter . . . .”19
At the circuit court level, it is well established that participation in an employer’s internal
investigation, on its own, is not protected by the other antiretaliation prong of Title VII: the

16

Id. at 87.
129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
18
Id. at 849.
17

19

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
6

participation clause.20 However, until Crawford the courts of appeals had not directly addressed
whether such conduct is protected under the opposition clause. In holding that such conduct falls
outside the scope of statutory protection, the Sixth Circuit in Crawford was out of sync with the
other circuits.
While circuit courts have taken various approaches in defining the scope of protected
employee “opposition,” common themes among their decisions point to a relatively consistent
body of law. Protected conduct clearly extends beyond the filing of a formal complaint.21 The
circuits are virtually unanimous in holding that “informal protests of discriminatory employment
practices” qualify for opposition clause protection.22 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in oft-cited language, listed several examples of such informal conduct: “making
complaints to management, writing critical letters to customers, protesting against discrimination
by industry or by society in general, and expressing support of coworkers who have filed formal
charges.”23 Other courts have followed the lead of the Second Circuit by extending protection to
letters written to management,24 internal complaints to supervisors,25 and the “informal
expressions of one’s views, whether through established grievance procedures or alternative
forms of protest.”26
When confronted with borderline cases, several circuits engage in some form of judicial
balancing to determine whether an employee’s conduct is protected under the opposition clause.
The Fourth Circuit’s balancing test weighs “the purpose of the Act to protect persons engaging
reasonably in activities opposing . . . discrimination, against Congress’ equally manifest desire
not to tie the hands of employers in the objective selection and control of personnel.”27
According to the Third Circuit, “there is no hard and fast rule” to apply, and the tough questions
are best answered by analyzing the substance—rather than the form—of the employee’s

20

See, e.g., EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“[U]nder the participation clause, an employer may not retaliate against an employee because
the employee has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” (quotation omitted)).
21
See, e.g., Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000); Laughlin v.
Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998).
22
Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 343 (3d Cir. 2006). See also, e.g.,
Valentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2006).
23
Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990).
24
See Abramson v. William Patterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 288 (employee’s letters);
O’Neal v. Ferguson Const. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001) (letters written by
employee’s attorney).
25
See Valentin-Almeyda, 447 F.3d 85; Pipkins v. City of Temple Terrace, 267 F.3d 1197
(11th Cir. 2001).
26
Dea v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 11 F. App’x 352, 361 (4th Cir. 2001).
27
Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998).
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conduct.28 The opposing activity at the heart of Crawford is one of those borderline cases, and
the Supreme Court addressed it through its own form of definitional balancing.
(ii.).

Facts of the Case

The unlawful employment practice at issue in Crawford was the creation of a hostile
work environment by Gene Hughes, who allegedly engaged in abusive sexual conduct.29
Hughes was the Employee Relations Director for the Metro School District. When a human
resources officer “began looking into rumors of sexual harassment,” Crawford—a Metro
employee—was interviewed and asked “whether she had witnessed ‘inappropriate behavior.’”30
She answered by describing “several instances” of what the Court deemed “sexually harassing
behavior.”31 As part of the investigation, two other employees reported sexually harassing
behavior by Hughes. Metro gave Hughes an oral reprimand, but fired all three employees who
complained about Hughes’s conduct.32
In deciding Crawford’s Title VII retaliation claim, the District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee found that Crawford’s statements fell outside the scope of the opposition
clause.33 It reasoned that, “she had not ‘instigated or initiated any complaint,’ but had ‘merely
answered questions posed by investigators in an already-pending internal investigation, initiated
by someone else.’”34 It thus granted summary judgment for Metro. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision by relying on a restrictive interpretation of the opposition
clause, which required opposition to be “active,” “consistent,” and “overt.”35
B.

SUPREME COURT
(i.)

Arguments Before the Court

The legal battle between the parties focused primarily on three issues: the statutory
meaning of “oppose,” the legislative intent behind Title VII, and the policy implications inherent
in statutory interpretation. There was also a lengthy debate regarding the participation clause,
but the Court passed on this issue as unnecessary to its holding.36

28

Curay-Cramer v. Ursaline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir.
2006) (“When deciding whether a plaintiff has engaged in opposition conduct, we look to the
message being conveyed rather than the means of conveyance.”).
29
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846,
849 (2009).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 850.
34
Id. (citation omitted).
35
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 211 F. App’x
373, 376 (6th Cir. 2006).
36
Id. at 377.
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Respondents Metro relied on dictionary definitions of “oppose,” arguing that the word’s
plain meaning required the communication of “resistance” or “hostile or contrary action.”37
Thus, for an employee to be protected by the opposition clause, she must “take some affirmative
steps to communicate opposition,” rather than “merely being in a re-active mode.”38 Because
Crawford did not initiate her complaint, Metro saw her actions as falling short of the “active”
and “overt” conduct required by the statute.39
Petitioner Crawford viewed the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of “oppose” as contrary to
the text and purposes of Title VII.40 Crawford’s argument focused on the social complexity
involved in workplace harassment, including the vulnerable position of victims. Countering the
necessity of “active” opposition, Crawford argued that “‘[p]assive resistance is a time honored
form of opposition.’”41 When sexual harassment victims attempt to prevent abuse by “trying to
stay, literally, out of reach,” this form of opposition should not be unprotected “merely because it
is relatively low key, quiet, or even entirely passive.”42 Countering the necessity of “overt”
opposition, Crawford explained that some workers “may opt for a less confrontational form of
opposition precisely because he or she is afraid of retaliation.”43 Thus, in order to avoid a
“perverse interpretation” of the opposition clause that exposes prudent victims to even greater
harm, protection should cover “the cautious as well as the brazen.”44 These arguments were
bolstered by Crawford’s reliance on the language of an EEOC Compliance Manual, which
described any statement or action that “would reasonably [be] interpreted as opposition” as
satisfying the requirements of the opposition clause.45
Furthermore, Crawford argued that the antiretaliatory purposes of Title VII would be
undermined if the Sixth Circuit’s holding were affirmed. To do so would arguably exclude from
future harassment cases the critical evidence of employee-witnesses, “whose statements may be
essential to determining the merits of the initial allegations.”46 Also, employees might interpret
the result of the new exceptions as “no protection at all.”47 Because few employees are able to
afford “the legal advice required to devise the sophisticated tactics needed to obtain protection,”
Crawford claimed that employers would be able to fire those who made their complaints “at the
wrong time, to the wrong person, or in the wrong terms.”48 Thus, the policy behind the statute—
eradicating workplace harassment—would necessarily be hampered by formal and technical
Brief for Respondents at 27, Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson
County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) (No. 06-1595).
38
Id. at 30.
39
Id.
40
Brief for Petitioners at 46, Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County,
Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) (No. 06-1595).
41
Id. at 47.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 51.
44
Id. at 50–51.
45
2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 8-II(B)(2), at 8–5 (Mar. 2003).
46
Brief for Petitioners, Crawford, supra note 40, at 12.
47
Id. at 54.
48
Id.
37
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restrictions.
Metro responded by claiming that an extensive interpretation of “oppose” would “warp[]
the meaning of the term and render[] the ‘participation’ clause superfluous.”49 Stretching the
scope of protection against retaliation to circumstances like those in this case, Metro argued,
would allow employees to “ambush” employers with bogus claims.50 Metro also claimed that
the Court’s previous rulings in Faragher v. Boca Raton51 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth52—which, according to Metro, both encouraged employers to be proactive in eradicating
discrimination and compelled employees to use the reasonable means available to them—would
be weakened by a broad reading of “oppose.”53
Alternatively, according to Metro, judicial policy-making was the wrong approach to
resolving “any perceived ambiguity” in the Act.54 Claiming that Chevron deference to Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)interpretations was inappropriate in this case,
Metro argued that changes to the statute (or to the rule-making authority of the EEOC) was a role
reserved to the legislative branch.55
(ii.)

Decision and Holding

Holding for Petitioner Crawford, the Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s restrictive
interpretation of “oppose” by turning to the word’s plain meaning. The Court relied on
dictionary definitions and “ordinary discourse” usage to find that, “’[o]ppose’ goes beyond
‘active, consistent’ behavior . . . .”56 It was also influenced by the EEOC’s interpretation of Title
VII’s opposition clause. Quoting from the same EEOC Compliance Manual cited by Crawford,
the Court held, “‘[w]hen an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer
has engaged in . . . a form of employment discrimination, that communication’ virtually always
‘constitutes the employee’s opposition to the activity.’”57 While the Court admitted possible
exceptions to this rule, it stated that “these will be eccentric cases.”58
Applied to the facts of this case, this broader definition of “oppose” encompassed
Crawford’s statements in response to Metro’s internal investigation. According to the Court,
“[t]here is . . . no reason to doubt that a person can ‘oppose’ by responding to someone else’s

49

Brief for Respondents, Crawford, supra note 37, at 25.
Id. at 32.
51
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
52
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
53
Brief for Respondents, Crawford, supra note 37, at 27–30.
54
Id. at 39.
55
Id. at 36–40.
56
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846,
851 (2009).
57
Id. (citing 2 EEOC Compl. Man. §§ 8-IIB(1)–(2), at 8–5 (Mar. 2003)) (italics in
original).
58
Id.
50
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question just as surely as by provoking the discussion.”59 To hold otherwise would lead to a
“freakish rule,” under which an employee would be protected by Title VII if she took the
initiative to report unlawful discrimination, but not if she reported “the same discrimination in
the same words” in response to her employer’s question.60
The Court also addressed Respondents’ argument that a broad reading of “oppose” would
undermine the purposes of Title VII by removing employers’ incentive to investigate possible
discrimination. The Court felt this argument underestimated the “strong inducement” that still
existed for employers to avoid liability by ending discrimination in their workplace.61
Furthermore, it rejected the claim that Faragher and Ellerth established an affirmative duty to
report for employees: “We have never suggested that employees have a legal obligation to report
discrimination against others to their employer on their own initiative, let alone lose statutory
protection by failing to speak.”62 Turning Metro’s argument on its head, the Court countered
that the Sixth Circuit’s holding would undermine the purposes of Title VII because it would give
“prudent employees . . . a good reason to keep quiet” about discrimination.63
The Court suggested in dicta that “opposition” could also refer to inaction or silence.
Citing a case from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,64 the Court attempted to broaden
the scope of the Act’s protection beyond the circumstances in this case. For example, the Court
“would call it ‘opposition’ if an employee took a stand against an employer’s discriminatory
practices not by ‘instigating’ action, but by standing pat, say, by refusing to follow a supervisor’s
order to fire a junior worker for discriminatory reasons.”65
(iii.)

Concurrence: Justice Alito’s Concern About “Silent Opposition”

It was this “silent opposition” scenario that led Justice Alito to write a concurring
opinion. Arguing that the Court’s holding should be limited to “employees who testify in
internal investigations or engage in analogous purposive conduct,” Alito feared a dramatic
increase in an already high number of EEOC retaliation claims.66 Justice Alito’s question
concerning protection for silent opposition is interesting. There are several likely scenarios in
which this issue might arise: retaliation against an employee who refuses to discriminate against
subordinates; retaliation against an employee who might be a witness and fails to respond when
asked about alleged harassment; preemptive discharge of an employee who is suspected of
59

Id.
Id.
61
Id. at 852.
62
Id. at 853 n.3.
63
Id. at 852.
64
McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (addressing situation where
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intending to file an EEOC charge or support a complainant. Since silent opposition was not
central to the holding in Crawford, however, this issue will have to be addressed in another
case.67
C.

ANALYSIS

The message for employers is clear: An adequate internal investigation should include
steps to protect employees who cooperate in good faith with the investigation and any
contemplated adverse action against employees who revealed wrongdoing should be scrutinized
closely before it is put into effect.
Few should be surprised by the outcome of this case. The “textualists” within the Court’s
conservative wing would have been hard-pressed to conclude that Congress intended a
distinction to be drawn between employees who initiate a complaint and employees who voice a
complaint in response to employer questioning. Even if the Court had affirmed the lower courts’
holdings, it could be anticipated that Congress and the President would simply have responded
by amending the statute, just as they have done recently with the ADA Amendments Act of
200868 and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.69
Crawford continues the Supreme Court’s trend of limiting bases for summary judgment
in Title VII cases. Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Court has issued a
number of decisions that have disapproved of rules crafted by the lower courts to limit
employers’ exposure to civil rights laws. For example, the Court has rejected lower court rulings
that imposed an extreme psychological injury requirement on harassment plaintiffs,70 that
disregarded biased and harassing statements by supervisors in a plaintiff’s hostile work
environment claim,71 and that failed to consider plaintiffs’ superior qualifications as evidence of
pretext in a race discrimination case.72 Indeed, there seems to be a clear trend that is continued
by the Court’s decision in Crawford.
It is possible that the Court’s holding in Crawford will discourage employers from
conducting an expansive investigation for fear that other employees, in the course of that
investigation, may voice complaints of discriminatory conduct. Justice Souter was dismissive of
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such a scenario, however, and predicted that any disincentive is outweighed by the incentive to
conduct a comprehensive investigation provided by Ellerth and Faragher.73
2.

AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen74
A.

CASE BACKGROUND
(i.)

Issue and Context

The issue in Hulteen was whether an employer necessarily violated Title VII—in
particular, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA)75—by continuing to acknowledge
differential seniority credit for pregnancy and disability leave that accrued before the PDA was
passed.76
In General Electric Corp. v. Gilbert,77 the Supreme Court had previously held that
disability benefits plans that excluded disabilities related to pregnancy were “not sex-based
discrimination within the meaning of Title VII.”78 Gilbert essentially made “differential
treatment of pregnancy leave . . . lawful . . . .”79 Congress responded by passing the PDA as an
amendment to Title VII two years later. The Court interpreted the PDA as a “clear” statement
that “treat[ing] pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other medical conditions” was
unlawful discrimination.80 Prior to Hulteen, however, circuit courts were split as to whether an
employer unlawfully discriminated by making post-PDA retirement calculations based in part
upon pre-PDA accrual policies.81
(ii.)

Facts of the Case

AT&T had a pension and other benefit plans that were based on the employee’s length of
service, which was measured as “the period of service at the company minus uncredited leave
time.”82 Prior to 1977, AT&T gave full service credit to employees who took disability leave, but
only a maximum of thirty days of credit to female employees who took a medical leave due to
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pregnancy.83 Between 1977 and 1979, AT&T amended this policy to grant service credit for up
to six weeks of pregnancy-related disability leave.
After the effective date of the PDA in 1979, AT&T amended its policies again. Its new
disability plan “provided service credit for pregnancy leave on the same basis as leave taken for
other temporary disabilities.”84 The plan did not grant additional service credit retroactively to
those women who had been denied service credit for pregnancy-related disability leave taken
prior to the passage of the PDA.85
Respondents, who each “received less service credit for pregnancy leave than she would
have accrued on the same leave for disability,” filed discrimination charges with the EEOC.86
After the EEOC found “reasonable cause to believe that AT&T had discriminated,” Respondents
sued, alleging that the denial of full service credit prior to the PDA amounted to discrimination
under Title VII.87
Following Ninth Circuit precedent,88 the District Court for the Northern District of
California ruled in favor of the Respondents.89 The court found that AT&T’s post-PDA benefit
calculations, based on pre-PDA service credit rules affording less credit for pregnancy-related
leave, violated Title VII.90 The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed.91
B.

SUPREME COURT
(i.)

Decision and Holding

The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 opinion by Justice Souter, reversed the Ninth Circuit.92 It
held that “there is no necessary violation” of the PDA, and that AT&T’s calculation of benefits
was insulated from a Title VII challenge because the calculation was “part of a bona fide
seniority system under § 703(h) of Title VII . . . .”93
Looking at AT&T’s calculation system, the Court found no “intention to discriminate,”94
even though the policy differentiated pregnant employees from other employees because, at the
time of the policy’s inception, such differential treatment was lawful under Gilbert.
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The Court rejected Hulteen’s argument that AT&T’s seniority system was facially
discriminatory from the start, reasoning that this would require retroactive application of the
PDA.95 There is a presumption against retroactive application of statutes,96 and the Court found
“no indication at all that Congress had retroactive application in mind” when drafting the PDA.97
The Court also rejected Hulteen’s argument that AT&T’s decision not to award
retroactive service credit for her pre-PDA leave was facially discriminatory at the time of her
post-PDA retirement. The Court stated that “[i]f a choice to rely on a favorable statute turned
every past differentiation into contemporary discrimination, [the exemption for seniority systems
under] subsection (h) [of Title VII] would never apply.”98
Finally, the Court considered whether the recently enacted amendments to Title VII—
known as the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act—dictated a different result.99 Under the Ledbetter
Act, a violation of Title VII occurs “when a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation
decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice . . . .”100 The Court held that, because AT&T’s system
was lawful at its inception, Hulteen was not “affected by application of a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice.”101
(ii.)

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented.102 In light of Congress’s express
repudiation of the Gilbert decision through the PDA, Ginsburg believed that any present effects
of pre-PDA discriminatory practices create a current violation of Title VII.103 She called on the
Court to expressly overrule Gilbert, “so that the decision can generate no more mischief.”104
C.

ANALYSIS

The practical impact of Hulteen for employers may be very limited. As long as an
employer’s seniority system was legal at its inception and was adjusted accordingly to meet its
ongoing obligations under Title VII, an employer can continue paying benefits under that system
even if the system perpetuates the effects of decisions that have since become unlawful.
Whether and to what extent employers are administering such systems remains unknown.
95
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It is possible, however, that Congress will consider overruling the Court’s decision, as it
did in the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which reversed the Court’s decision in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company.105 Thus, the most noteworthy and significant developments
following Hulteen may occur not in the lower courts but in the legislative branch.
B.

ERISA
1.

Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan106
A.

CASE BACKGROUND
(i.)

Issues and Context

In Kennedy, the Court addressed two main issues. First, whether the common law waiver
of savings and investment plan (SIP) benefits that was signed as part of a divorce decree was
ineffective because it invoked ERISA’s anti-alienation provision,107 even though the divorce
decree was not a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO).108 Second, whether, in any event,
the administrator acted consistently with ERISA by paying the SIP benefits in question,
consistent with the beneficiary designation under the plan instruments.109
(ii.)

Facts of the Case

William Kennedy was employed by DuPont and participated in their savings and
investment plan (SIP) under ERISA.110 In 1974, he signed a form designating his wife, Liv
Kennedy, the beneficiary under his SIP. In 1994, the Kennedys divorced subject to a decree that
purported to divest Liv Kennedy of all rights under William Kennedy’s employment benefit
programs. Although William Kennedy changed the designated beneficiary of his pension to his
daughter, Kari, he neglected to change the beneficiary of his SIP.
When William Kennedy died in 2001, Kari Kennedy asked that the SIP, worth $400,000,
be paid to the estate. DuPont, however, followed the designation form specified in the plan and
paid the SIP to Liv Kennedy. Kari Kennedy sued on behalf of the estate as the administrator of
the will.
(iii.)

Lower Courts
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The District Court ruled for the estate, holding that a beneficiary could waive his or her
right to benefits if the waiver was “explicit, voluntary, and made in good faith.”111 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that Liv Kennedy’s waiver was an assignment or alienation under
ERISA’s anti-alienation provision, and thus could not be honored.112 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
found that DuPont acted consistently with ERISA in paying the SIP to her.113
B.

SUPREME COURT

The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the SIP benefits were properly paid to
Liv Kennedy, “albeit on reasoning different from the Fifth Circuit’s rationale.”114 The Court
differed from the Fifth Circuit in first holding, unanimously, that Liv Kennedy’s waiver was
effective.115 However, it also held that DuPont acted consistently with ERISA by paying the SIP
benefit consistently with the beneficiary designation under the plan instruments.116
Under section 1056(d)(1) of ERISA, benefits cannot be “assigned” or “alienated” unless
by a qualified domestic relations order.117 Liv Kennedy’s waiver was not an assignment or
alienation under the normal meaning of those terms since she did not assign them to anyone.118
Therefore, her waiver was valid.119
Nonetheless, this waiver did not bind DuPont.120 ERISA requires that each plan “be
established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument” and that the plan administrator is
required to act “in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan.”121 The
administrator’s obligation to follow plan documents dominates over state law or federal common
law.122 DuPont, acting as administrator, fulfilled its obligation under ERISA by paying benefits
to Liv in accordance with William’s designation in the plan documents, despite the common law
waiver.123
C.

ANALYSIS

The Court’s decision in Kennedy gives clear directions to plan managers on how to deal
with the consequences of a beneficiary’s divorce. The Court appeared to proclaim a "bright-line
111
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requirement" that plan documents determine plan distributions.124 In general, the Court said, an
administrator must simply “look at the plan documents and records conforming to them” to find
out who is to be paid the benefits; there is no need, it added, to go to court for the answer.125
In reaching this ruling, the Court resolved two conflicts that had built up in lower courts
concerning spousal rights after divorce. First, the Court made it clear that a former spouse can
give up the right to benefits as part of a divorce decree. Second, the Court held that the ultimate
question of whether the ex-spouse was entitled to the benefits is to be decided by the specific
terms of the plan—in short, by what the documents say.
The victory for ex-spouses in Liv Kennedy’s situation, though, may not be complete. In a
footnote, the Court explicitly said that it was leaving open the question of whether the estate
could have sued to recover the benefits from Liv after she received them.126 The Court cited prior
rulings that seemed to say that a prior contractual agreement to forfeit funds may be enforceable
after the distribution without violating ERISA; once the money is paid out, it loses its ERISA
protection.127
C.

Public Sector Labor Law Cases
1.

Locke v. Karass128
A.

CASE BACKGROUND
(i.)

Issue and Context

This case addressed whether the First Amendment permits national litigation to be
considered a chargeable cost in the context of nonmember union service fees.129 It dealt with a
local union that required nonmembers to pay a service fee, a portion of which was “use[d] to pay
for litigation expenses incurred in large part on behalf of other local units.”130
Supreme Court precedent was extremely important in Locke, because “[p]rior decisions
of [the] Court frame[d] the question before [the Court].”131 Three prior cases established what
the Court deemed “a general First Amendment principle” that public and private labor unions
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could charge non-member employees a service fee as a condition of employment.132 Two later
cases “refined” that principle133 and “ma[d]e clear” that certain expenses are permitted while
others are not.134 Charges not permitted were those related to “political or ideological
activities.”135 Charges that were permitted were those “for activities more directly related to
collective bargaining.”136 The Court has justified this distinction by citing “government’s interest
in preventing freeriding . . . and in maintaining peaceful labor relations.”137
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Court relied on Railway Employes v. Hanson
and Machinists v. Street in finding that “the furtherance of the common cause leaves some
leeway for the leadership of the group.”138 The First Amendment challenge brought in Abood
focused on the interference of service fees “with an employee’s freedom to associate for the
advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit.”139 The Court held that “such
interference . . . is constitutionally justified by the . . . important contribution of the union shop to
the system of labor relations established by Congress.”140
The two Supreme Court cases that refined this principle were Ellis v. Railway Clerks141
and Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association.142 In Ellis, the Court defined a constitutionally
permissible fee as one relating to “expenditures [that] are necessarily or reasonably incurred for
the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing
with the employer on labor-management issues.”143 This definition included “the direct costs of
negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining contract,” as well as “the expenses of
activities or undertakings normally or reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the duties
of the union as exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.”144 The
examples the Court gave of chargeable expenses were those related to national conventions,
social activities, and publications (at least the part of publications that were not political). The
Court justified this conclusion by stating that a local union’s “corporate or associational
existence” must be maintained in order for it to function effectively.145
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The Ellis opinion also addressed litigation costs.146 The distinction the Court drew
between permissible and non-permissible litigation costs was similar to that drawn between other
union expenses.147 The Locke Court thus invoked Ellis for the principle that permissible costs
were those “litigation expenses incidental to the local union’s negotiation or administration of a
collective-bargaining agreement, fair representation litigation, jurisdictional disputes, or other
litigation normally conducted by an exclusive representative.”148 The non-permissible costs were
those expenses of litigation “not having such connection with the bargaining unit . . . .”149
The scope of the Court’s two-part holding in Lehnert, however, became the primary
dispute between the parties in Locke.150 The first part of the Lehnert holding established that “a
chargeable expenditure must bear an appropriate relation to collective-bargaining activity.151
The main issue, though, was whether nonmembers could be charged for activities that were
closely related to collective bargaining, but were “not undertaken directly on behalf of the
bargaining unit to which the objecting employees belong.”152 The Lehnert Court did not directly
resolve this issue.
Five of the justices in Lehnert held that a local union was permitted to charge
nonmembers “for their pro rata share of the costs associated with otherwise chargeable activities
of its state and national affiliates, even if those activities were not performed for the direct
benefit of the objecting employees’ bargaining unit.”153 Lehnert rejected the argument that a
“direct relationship” was required between the costs and a “tangible benefit” to the local union,
finding that this approach would “ignore the unified-membership structure” of unions.154 Rather
than requiring a direct relationship, the Lehnert majority required only that the costs be “for
services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union by virtue of
their membership in the parent organization.”155 The benefits the majority mentioned related to
the “considerable economic, political, and informational resources” that the national union could
provide for its local affiliates.156
On the topic of national litigation costs, “the [Lehnert] Court split into three
irreconcilable factions.”157 One faction of four justices stated that national litigation could be
considered an “expressive” activity that was “more akin to lobbying,” even though the
“precedent established through litigation on behalf of one unit may ultimately be of some use to
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another unit.”158 Another faction of four justices stated that including national litigation costs in
the service fee violated the First Amendment, “except when those costs pay for specific services
‘actually provided’ to the local.”159 This faction would have required the same direct
relationship between costs and benefits that the majority rejected. The final faction, consisting
only of Justice Marshall, rejected the idea that national litigation costs were “per se
nonchargeable,” and pointed out that the Court failed to directly resolve this issue, because the
plurality’s approach was merely dicta.160
The Court’s conflicting treatment of the chargeability of national litigation costs in
Lehnert naturally led to “uncertainty among the Circuits.”161 It was this issue that was central to
the Court’s decision in Locke.
(ii.)

Facts of the Case

The dispute in Locke centered on a collective bargaining agreement between the State of
Maine and the Maine State Employees Association.162 The service fee at issue in this agreement
“include[d] a charge that represents the affiliation fee the local pa[id] to its national union.”163
While the union did not require nonmembers to pay any portion of the fee that would be used for
nonchargeable activities of the national union, its fee did include “an amount that helps the
national pay for litigation activities.”164
The nonmember petitioners challenged the constitutionality of this fee, because some of
the national litigation costs “d[id] not directly benefit Maine’s state employees’ local but rather
directly benefit[ed] other locals or the national organization itself.”165 Even though the actual
costs per nonmember were “small,” petitioners challenged the fee because they “believed the
principle [was] important.” 166
However, the portion of the fee that went to national litigation costs only included
“activities that are of a chargeable kind.”167 In other words, nonmembers were not required to
pay for national litigation that was aimed at promoting the national union’s political or
ideological goals.
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(iii.)

Lower Courts

Petitioners’ challenge was first addressed by an arbitrator, who “found all aspects of the
service fee lawful.”168 Then, petitioners brought suit in federal court, “claim[ing] that the First
Amendment prohibits charging them for any portion of the service fee that represents . . .
‘national litigation,’ i.e., litigation that does not directly benefit the local.”169 Maine’s district
court found “no material facts at issue, [and] upheld [the national litigation] element of the
fee.”170 On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed.171
B.

SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court resolved this issue by relying on its previous holdings in Hanson,
Street, Abood, Ellis, and Lehnert.172 Specifically, it turned to the standards set forth by the
Lehnert majority.173 Though Lehnert’s holding was limited to “other national expenses,” the
Court in Locke believed that “logic suggests that the same standard should apply to national
litigation.”174 It held that national litigation costs are chargeable when the two following
circumstances are met:
(1) the subject matter of the national litigation bears an appropriate relation to
collective bargaining and (2) the arrangement is reciprocal—that is, the local’s payment to
the national affiliate is for “services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members
of the local union by virtue of their membership in the parent organization.”175
The Court rejected petitioners’ arguments, which relied upon a mistaken application of
Ellis and Lehnert.176 It viewed Ellis as not being on point.177 Because “the Ellis court focused
upon a local union’s payment of national litigation expenses without any understanding as to
reciprocity,” the Court there did not touch on the central issue in Locke.178 Lehnert was deemed
similarly inapplicable, because “the plurality could not (and did not) decide whether an
understanding as to reciprocity produced the relationship necessary for chargeability.”179 Even if
it had, the Court reasoned, “a plurality does not speak for the Court as a whole.”180 Therefore,
the Court’s precedent was “ambiguous on the point at issue.”181
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Applying its two-part test, the Court deemed the national litigation costs in the Maine
collective bargaining agreement chargeable.182 First, it found that the costs bore an appropriate
relation to collective bargaining. The Court reached this conclusion because the agreement
charged nonmembers only for “the kind of national litigation activity” that the courts had
previously deemed chargeable.183 In other words, the national litigation costs “were comparable
to those undertaken by the local and which the local deemed chargeable.”184 Second, it found
that the costs established a reciprocal arrangement. Although “the existence of reciprocity [was]
assumed by the parties and not . . . in dispute,” the Court still applied the second part of the test
to the agreement.185 It reasoned that the service fee gave the union “general access to the
national’s financial resources . . . ‘which would not otherwise be available to the local union
when needed to effectively negotiate, administer or enforce the local’s collective bargaining
agreements.’”186 The Court deemed this the type of activity which “‘may ultimately inure to the
benefit of the members of the local union by virtue of their membership in the parent
organization.’”187 As a result of this analysis, the Court held that the national litigation costs in
the agreement were “both appropriately related to collective bargaining and reciprocal.”188
Therefore, “those expenses are chargeable.”189
2.

Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association190
A.

CASE BACKGROUND
(i.)

Issue and Context

The issue before the Court was whether Idaho’s ban on payroll deductions for political
activities, as it applied to local government employers, infringed unions’ First Amendment
rights. Two cases provide helpful context to the Court’s resolution of this issue.
In Davenport v. Washington Education Association,191 a statute required consent from
nonunion members before fees could be used for political activities. The statute did not require
consent before fees could be used for other, non-election-related, purposes.192 The union argued
that statute infringed their First Amendment rights, but the Court disagreed. Though content182
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based speech restrictions are “presumptively invalid” and subject to strict scrutiny, the Court
found no such restrictions and applied rational basis review instead.193 The Court held that the
statute merely declined to assist union speech—rather than suppressing it—and that the State’s
action was reasonable in light of its interests in preserving the integrity of the political process.194
In Consolidated Edison Company of New York v. Public Services Commission of New
York,195 a state commission attempted to prohibit a private utility company from distributing
leaflets addressing controversial environmental issues. The Court’s analysis of the First
Amendment issue hinged upon the relationship of the State and the state-regulated utility. It
determined that the utility was a private entity, entitled to constitutional protection, and that the
state’s regulatory control over the utility did not authorize the prohibition at issue. Therefore, the
prohibition infringed the utility’s First Amendment rights.
(ii.)

Facts of the Case

Idaho’s Right to Work Act allows private and public sector employers to deduct union
fees from employee paychecks, as long as the employees have provided their written
authorization.196 In 2003, the Idaho legislature enacted the Voluntary Contributions Act (VCA),
which amended the Right to Work Act.197 The VCA prohibited payroll deductions for political
purposes.198 This meant that a portion of the previously deductible union fees were excluded
from the payroll deduction process.
The Pocatello Education Association (PEA)—a group of Idaho public employee
unions—sued several state officers in their official capacities, alleging that the VCA’s
prohibition violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.199
(iii.)

Lower Courts

The proceedings at the federal trial court level narrowed the issue.200 The District Court
for the District of Idaho held that the VCA was constitutional as applied to state government, but
unconstitutional as applied to private employers and local governments.201 The distinction was
based on the fact that the state government did not provide subsidies to private employers or
local governments to administer their payroll deductions.202
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The parties’ strategies on appeal narrowed the issue further. “Neither party challenged
the District Court’s rulings as to private and state-level employees, and therefore the only issue
remaining concerned application of the ban to local government employees.”203 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision. Relying on Consolidated
Edison, the court analogized the state-government/local-government relationship to the stategovernment/regulated-private-utility relationship and found that Idaho had no control over the
payroll deductions at the local government level.204 The court found that Idaho’s interests did not
meet strict scrutiny and thus held the VCA unconstitutional as applied to local governments.205
B.

SUPREME COURT
(i.)

Arguments Before the Court

The unions argued that the VCA’s ban “singles out political speech for disfavored
treatment.”206 Relying on Davenport, they asserted that the ban was thus “presumptively
invalid” and subject to strict scrutiny.207 The unions further argued that strict scrutiny “is still
warranted when the ban is applied to local government employers.”208 At the local level, Idaho
was not merely declining to promote speech, but was instead violating the First Amendment by
infringing speech through the local government’s payroll deduction systems.209
Idaho argued that the VCA’s ban did not target any specific speech, but rather operated as
an across-the-board prohibition on all political payroll deductions. Asserting that the VCA
should be analyzed under rational basis review, Idaho argued that “the State’s interest in
avoiding the appearance that carrying out the public’s business is tainted by partisan political
activity” was reasonable.210
(ii.)

Decision and Holding

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the VCA was constitutional
as applied to local governments.211 The Court’s three-part analysis determined that (1) the VCA,
in merely “declining to promote” speech, merited rational basis review; (2) the VCA clearly
served Idaho’s legitimate interests; and (3) the same review applies to local government
subdivisions within Idaho’s state government.
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The Court first determined that Idaho, through the VCA, “has not infringed the unions’
First Amendment rights.”212 This determination rested upon the Court’s distinction between
government action that abridges speech and action that declines to promote speech. The First
Amendment protects the former but not the latter. “[I]t does not confer an affirmative right to
use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression.”213
Finding that the unions are still free to engage in protected speech and “simply are barred from
enlisting the State in support of that endeavor,” the Court concluded that the VCA was “not an
abridgment of the unions’ speech.”214
Because the Court found no First Amendment infringement, it next rejected strict
scrutiny in favor of rational basis review.215 Idaho’s asserted interests in enacting the VCA were
to “avoid[] the reality or appearance of government favoritism or entanglement with partisan
politics,” and to “distinguish[] between internal governmental operations and private speech.”216
The Court had no problem determining that these interests were reasonable. Relying almost
entirely on Davenport in resolving this issue, it held that the VCA’s prohibition “plainly serves
the State’s interest.”217
The Court’s final step was to address the purported distinction between the state
government and its political subdivisions. It found the Ninth Circuit’s analogy to regulated
private utilities “misguided.”218 The Court instead characterized local governments as
“subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of
state governmental functions.”219 These subordinate political subdivisions do not enjoy the same
constitutional protections as private corporations. Therefore, the Court applied “the same
deferential review” to the VCA at the local level.220 Not surprisingly, it held that the VCA’s
prohibition also furthered Idaho’s interests at this level.
(iii.)

Justice Ginsburg’s “Classification Question”

Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion, arguing that the issue before the Court was
narrower than the one decided. Hers was a “classification question”: “should the Court align
local-government employment with private-sector employment or with state-level
employment?”221 Limiting her answer to the specific context of this case, Ginsburg found that
“the Constitution compels no distinction between state and local governmental entities.”222
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(iv.)

Justice Breyer’s Intermediate Scrutiny: A Proportionality Inquiry

Justice Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed with
the Court’s statement that a constitutional distinction existed between “abridging” speech and
“declining to promote” speech. However, he found this distinction “more metaphysical than
practical.”223 Rather than focusing on this bright-line distinction—which would lead either to
strict scrutiny or rational basis review—he suggested a more nuanced analysis. He found this
approach appropriate here, where the State action “indirectly” affects speech.224
Breyer proposed a form of “intermediate scrutiny” that involved “proportionality
questions.”225 He suggested that the Court propose the following inquiry:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

What is “the seriousness of the speech-related harm the provision likely
cause”?
What is “the importance of the provision’s countervailing objectives”?
What is “the extent to which the statute will tend to achieve those
objectives”?
Are “there are other less restrictive ways of doing so”?226

The aim of this inquiry should be to “determine[] whether ultimately the statute works speechrelated harm that is out of proportion to its justifications.”227 Because Breyer was “not clear”
about whether the VCA “operate[d] even handedly,” he would have remanded the cases for a
decision on this issue.228
(v.)

Justice Stevens’s Legislative Intent Argument

Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion focused primarily on the intent of the Idaho
legislature in enacting the VCA. He conceded that the VCA was facially neutral. However, his
examination of the statutory context revealed the VCA’s “discriminatory purpose.”229 Stevens
determined that “the restriction was more narrowly intended to target union fundraising” by
showing that the VCA and the Right to Work Act “pertain exclusively to unions” and were
“directed at union activities.”230 He also pointed to the breadth of the VCA, which was enacted
to apply to private as well as public employers, as being incompatible with Idaho’s asserted
interests. Concluding that the VCA was “clear[ly] . . . intended to make it more difficult for
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unions to finance political speech,” Stevens held the statute “unconstitutional in all its
applications.”231
(vi.)

Justice Souter’s Dilemma: “Reasonable Suspicion of Viewpoint
Discrimination”

Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion asserted that the Court should have never granted the
writ of certiorari. Based on the narrow issue before the Court and the litigation strategy of the
parties, Souter warned against this case serving “as a vehicle to refine First Amendment
doctrine.”232 Looking to the statutory context and relying on Justice Stevens’s analysis, Souter
concluded that “[u]nion speech, and nothing else, seems to have been on the legislative mind.”233
Dealing with this “reasonable suspicion of viewpoint discrimination” presented a unique
“dilemma” for the Court.234
Souter’s point was that this dilemma was not before the Court. The unions’ litigation
strategy—conceding the constitutionality as it applied to the State, and focusing narrowly on the
state-government/local-government distinction—precluded the Court from properly addressing
“the elephant in the room.”235 Souter argued that, by “shut[ting their] eyes” to this dilemma, the
Court risked ignoring “the specter of another First Amendment category, one of superior
significance, . . . too insistent to ignore.”236
III.

Close Cases

Not surprisingly, the greatest legal and public scrutiny attached to the three close cases of
this Term. Each of these three cases made important contributions to the law.
A.

Private Sector Labor Law
1.

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett237
A.

CASE BACKGROUND
(i.)

Issue and Context

The issue in 14 Penn Plaza was whether a specific provision in a collective bargaining
agreement was enforceable. The provision “clearly and unmistakably” required union members
to submit individual statutory discrimination claims to an arbitration process.
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The claims at issue arose under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
which “prohibits employers and unions from discriminating against persons over the age of 40
with respect to any term, condition, or privilege of employment.”238 Also at issue was the scope
of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which states that “an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of . . . a contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”239
Prior to this case, the majority of circuit courts agreed that a union was not free to waive
an individual employee’s statutory discrimination claims through binding arbitration under a
collective bargaining agreement. This position seemed justified in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.240
In Gardner-Denver, an employee claimed that he was discharged in violation of the “just
cause” provision of the collective bargaining agreement.241 The employee also claimed that his
discharge was motivated by racial discrimination, and thus violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. After the agreement’s arbitration procedure yielded no relief for the employee, he
brought a claim in federal court. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected the
claim, finding that the employee was bound by the arbitrator’s decision. The Supreme Court
reversed, however, and held that the employee was entitled to pursue his statutory rights
independent of the confines of the collective bargaining agreement. The opinion also questioned
whether the arbitration forum was an appropriate setting for resolution of statutory (as opposed
to contractual) rights.
In the years since Gardner-Denver, though, the Court’s opinion of arbitration as a
mechanism for resolving employment disputes has changed. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,242 held that the FAA covered arbitration provisions in individual employment contracts
“unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue.”243 The FAA’s scope was extended by Circuit City Stores v. Adams,244
which reaffirmed that “arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA without
contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving employees specific protection
against discrimination prohibited by federal law.”245 Despite the trend in federal courts favoring
arbitration, the collective waiver of individual statutory rights was not taken lightly. In Wright v.
Universal Maritime Service Corp.,246 the Supreme Court explicitly addressed the topic of waiver
and held that, in order for a court to conclude that an individual had waived his right to
238
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adjudicate statutory claims, this waiver must be “clear and unmistakable.”247 The question at the
heart of 14 Penn Plaza was whether unions could also bargain away their members’ individual
statutory rights.
(ii.)

Facts of the Case

This case dealt mainly with one provision of a collective bargaining agreement. The
parties to the agreement were the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations (RAB)—a multiemployer bargaining association consisting of members of the New York City real estate
industry—and Service Employees International Union Local 32BJ. Petitioner 14 Penn Plaza was
a member of the RAB. Respondents were three former members of the union employed by
Temco, a third-party contractor, as night watchmen and porters in 14 Penn Plaza’s commercial
office building in New York City.
The parties agreed in 1999 to the provision at issue—Section 30 of the agreement. This
provision barred discrimination against employees on various grounds, including age
discrimination under the ADEA. It also required employees to submit any statutory
discrimination claims to binding arbitration under the agreement’s grievance and dispute
resolution procedures. These procedures were deemed “the sole and exclusive remedy for
violations.”248 The agreement also instructed arbitrators to “apply appropriate law in rendering
decisions based upon claims of discrimination.”249
In 2003, 14 Penn Plaza hired a new security services contractor, which meant it no longer
needed Temco’s services. The union agreed to this decision. At that time, respondents “were the
only building employees over 50 years old.”250 Temco reassigned them to new positions at
different locations. The employees claimed that the new positions were undesirable for several
reasons, including lower wages.
The union filed a grievance on behalf of respondents, alleging that the change violated
the collective bargaining agreement. The grievance initially alleged that the petitioner’s decision
violated Section 30, but the union later withdrew this claim.251 Respondents requested that the
union take their statutory discrimination claims to arbitration, but the union refused.
Respondents filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC);
the EEOC dismissed the complaint, but issued respondents “right to sue” letters.
(iii.)

Lower Courts
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Respondents filed a statutory age discrimination complaint against 14 Penn Plaza in the
Southern District of New York, alleging violation of the ADEA. 14 Penn Plaza filed a motion to
compel arbitration, but this motion was denied by the District Court. The Second Circuit, bound
by its own precedent and Supreme Court precedent, affirmed.252 The Court of Appeals
acknowledged the tension between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer, but held that collective
bargaining provisions requiring arbitration of individual statutory claims were unenforceable.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to address the issue left unresolved in Wright, which
continues to divide the Courts of Appeals.”253
B.

SUPREME COURT
(i.)

Arguments Before the Court

The parties differed over whether the union was authorized to agree, on behalf of its
members, to arbitrate statutory claims. Respondents argued that the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) authorizes unions to waive employees’ “collective and economic rights” but not
“individual, non-economic rights, such as those under the federal antidiscrimination statutes.”254
They claimed that the latter are unwaivable, because “[t]hey devolve on petitioners as individual
workers, not as members of a collective organization.”255 Rather than confronting this position
directly, petitioners described the arbitration provision not as a waiver of any substantive right
but rather as waiver “only of a judicial forum for discrimination claims.”256 They argued that
selection of dispute resolution mechanisms “is a core example of a ‘term or condition of
employment’ . . . and an appropriate subject for bargaining by the union.”257
Since the individual right at issue was linked to a specific statute, a central part of this
debate centered on what Congress intended in passing the ADEA. Respondents argued that
Congress provided “overlapping remedies” under the ADEA258 and imposed strict requirements
on the waiver of these statutory rights. They turned to the legislative history as proof that
“Congress intended to encourage arbitration only where an individual voluntarily waived his
right to proceed in court.”259 Claiming that the employees here did not waive their rights
knowingly and voluntarily, respondents argued that the union should have been precluded from
waiving them. They saw this conclusion as consistent with the “wider statutory scheme” (which
includes the ADEA) that is aimed at protecting “important public rights.”260 However,
petitioners pointed to the Court’s holding in Gilmer, which required an “inherent conflict” to
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exist between a statute and the use of an arbitral forum in order to deem a waiver invalid.261
Since Gilmer found that no such conflict existed under the ADEA, Petitioners argued that the
Court had already settled this issue. The Court had already concluded that “there is simply no
legislative direction [in the ADEA] instructing courts to carve out from FAA enforcement
collectively bargained arbitral promises.”262
Perhaps the most important issue between the parties was the dispute over Supreme Court
precedent. This dispute centered on defining the scope of the Court’s holding in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver.263
Respondents argued that Gardner-Denver was controlling here, because it held “that
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement could not preclude an individual employee’s
right to bring a lawsuit in court to vindicate a statutory discrimination claim.”264 They saw this
as distinguishable from the holding in Gilmer, where “a sophisticated person in an individual
employment contract” voluntarily consented to the waiver of statutory rights.265 Petitioners
viewed the Gardner-Denver holding more narrowly and claimed it was not controlling here.
They argued that it decided only “whether an employee’s submission of his contractual claim to
arbitration precluded him from bringing a later lawsuit to vindicate his statutory rights under
Title VII.”266 Also, the agreement at issue in Gardner-Denver did not grant the arbitrator
authority to “invoke public laws” or “base decisions on statutory law.”267 Petitioners
distinguished this from the present case, where respondents were asking the Court to “refuse to
enforce collectively bargained clear agreements to arbitrate,” in which the arbitrator was directed
to “apply appropriate law in rendering decisions based upon claims of discrimination.”268
Petitioners also claimed that Gardner-Denver’s policy arguments against arbitration were
“specifically considered and rejected” by the Court in Gilmer.269 In particular, they addressed
the issue of union control of arbitration and the potential conflict of interest unions face in
advocating for individual employee rights. Petitioners argued that this issue should not be an
obstacle to enforcing arbitration here, “in part because multiple structural protections safeguard
individual claims from collective harm.”270 They pointed out a union’s duty of fair
representation, employees’ right to seek relief with the EEOC and NLRB, and the fact that
unions are also subject to antidiscrimination statutes.271 Respondents acknowledged that these
261
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safeguards existed but argued that they are insufficient and incomplete remedies for employees
fighting workplace discrimination.272 They cited Gardner-Denver for the proposition that
antidiscrimination statutes protect “an individual’s right to equal employment opportunities,” and
“not majoritarian processes.”273
The parties also differed over whether the FAA encompasses arbitration of statutory
claims. Petitioners claimed “[i]t has long been settled law” that agreements to arbitrate such
claims are enforceable under the FAA and argued that the Supreme Court “has rejected the
notion that enforcing [them] . . . would somehow weaken the protections of substantive law.”274
Respondents agreed with this position in part but included an important qualification that applies
when collective bargaining agreements are involved. They cited Gilmer for the proposition that
“waiver is enforceable under [FAA] case law only if the employee ‘effectively may vindicate [his
or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.’”275 Under this view, arbitration would not
“provide an alternative viable forum” if a union were free to choose not to arbitrate employee
claims.276
These different interpretations of the FAA carried over into different views on arbitration
in general. Petitioners saw the FAA as “embod[ying] a national policy favoring arbitration,
especially in the employment context.”277 They identified distinct advantages provided by
arbitration, among which were efficient proceedings and lower costs for employees.278 This
position framed arbitration as “consistent with the dispute resolution goals underlying the
national labor laws.”279
Respondents, however, viewed arbitration in a different light and distinguished
commercial arbitration from labor arbitration. In their view, labor arbitration is “part of a private
system of workplace self-governance, not a substitute forum to litigate statutory claims.”280
Pointing to the purpose of labor arbitration—furthering industrial peace rather than protecting
individual rights—respondents argued that this unique dispute resolution mechanism “is illsuited to resolve individual employees’ antidiscrimination claims.”281 They saw the role of labor
arbitrators as limited to “resolving issues concerning the [collective bargaining] agreement . . .
[and] apply[ing] the ‘law of the shop.’”282
(ii.)

Decision and Holding
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Holding for 14 Penn Plaza, the Court held that “a collective-bargaining agreement that
clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a
matter of law.”283
The Court began by rejecting respondents’ argument that the arbitration provision
exceeded the permissible scope of the collective bargaining agreement. “Nothing in the law
suggests a distinction between . . . arbitration agreements signed by an individual employee and
those agreed to by a union representative.”284 It found that the union properly exercised its
“broad authority” under the NLRA by bargaining in good faith with RAB.285 Thus, the
arbitration provision was viewed as a “freely negotiated term,” which “easily qualifies as a
‘conditio[n] of employment’ that is subject to mandatory bargaining under [29 U.S.C.]
§ 159(a).”286 Rejecting respondents’ claim that the right to arbitration is unwaivable, the Court
concluded that the union’s selection of arbitration to resolve statutory discrimination claims was
“no different from the many other decisions made by parties in designing grievance machinery”
under collective bargaining agreements.287
Furthermore, the Court found that the agreement’s arbitration provision was not in
conflict with the ADEA nor its “remedial and deterrent function.”288 “[T]he agreement to
arbitrate ADEA claims is not the waiver of a ‘substantive right’ as that term is employed in the
ADEA.”289 Gilmer “squarely held” that the text and legislative history of the ADEA revealed
“no evidence” that Congress “intended to preclude arbitration of claims under that Act.”290
Therefore, since Congress chose to allow for arbitration of these claims, “[t]he Judiciary must
respect that choice.”291
Central to the Court’s holding was its interpretation of precedent. It agreed with
petitioners’ view that “[t]he holding of Gardner-Denver is not as broad as Respondents
suggest.”292 Gardner-Denver was distinguishable because it dealt with an agreement that neither
expressly addressed individual statutory rights nor subjected statutory antidiscrimination claims
to mandatory arbitration. The Court also addressed decisions following Gardner-Denver and
found that they had “not broadened its holding to make it applicable to the facts of this case.”293
This result was supported by the reasoning in Gilmer, which “made clear that the Gardner283
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Denver line of cases . . . do not control the outcome where. . . [the] arbitration provision
expressly covers both statutory and contractual discrimination claims.”294 Therefore, the Court
found nothing in Gardner-Denver—nor its progeny—that prohibited enforcement of the
arbitration provision in the present case.
The Court also undercut respondents’ reliance on Gardner-Denver’s policy arguments
against arbitration. It acknowledged “the Gardner-Denver line of cases included broad dicta that
was highly critical of the use of arbitration for the vindication of statutory antidiscrimination
rights.”295 However, this was deemed a “distorted understanding” of the collective bargaining
process, and a “misconceived view of arbitration that this Court has since abandoned.”296 These
misconceptions have been corrected and replaced with a view that arbitrators are capable of
resolving statutory antidiscrimination claims. Referring to the “radical change . . . in the Court’s
receptivity to arbitration,” the Court warned that reliance on decisions hostile to arbitration
“would be ill advised.”297
Dispelling respondents’ concerns about union control over the arbitration process, the
Court found that Congress has provided adequate remedies for employees pursuing
antidiscrimination claims. The safeguards referred to by petitioners (a union’s duty of fair
representation, opportunities provided by EEOC and NLRB, and a union’s own statutory
liability) were deemed sufficient to remedy “the situation where a labor union is less than
vigorous in defense of its members’ claims of discrimination under the ADEA.”298 Commenting
broadly upon “the benefits of organized labor,” the Court stated that Respondents’ argument
about union conflicts of interest “amount[ed] to a collateral attack on the NLRA.”299 The Court
concluded that such arguments would be unsustainable “[u]ntil Congress amends the ADEA.”300
Since the union did not exceed its authority in bargaining for the arbitration provision,
and since the Court found Gardner-Denver distinguishable, the agreement was deemed
enforceable under the FAA. The Court reaffirmed “that arbitration agreements can be enforced
under the FAA without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving employees
specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law.”301 It cited Circuit City for
the proposition that “[p]arties generally favor arbitration precisely because of the economics of
dispute resolution.”302
However, the Court refrained from addressing whether the FAA would compel
arbitration of an agreement that actually prevented employees from “‘effectively vindicating’
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their ‘federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.’”303 It was hesitant to invalidate the
agreement in the present case “on the basis of speculation,” so it left this issue for another day.304
Another unaddressed issue was what a “clear and unmistakable” waiver, as required by
Wright, would look like in the context of a collective bargaining agreement. Because
respondents did not argue that the wavier in this case was unclear or unmistakable, the Court
assumed that it was.
(iii.)

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissent
maintained that Gardner-Denver, along with the principle of stare decisis, called for refusing to
enforce the contract’s pre-dispute arbitration clause as applied to the respondents’ ADEA
claim.305 The dissent noted that all but one of the courts of appeals had reached the same result.
The dissenters took the position that Gardner-Denver had concluded that unions could
not waive an individual employee’s access to a judicial forum to resolve a statutory
discrimination claim. Additionally, the dissenting opinion noted that Gardner-Denver rejected
the argument that participating in the arbitration amounted to a waiver of the right of access to a
judicial forum for a Title VII claim as well as the suggestion that federal courts are required to
defer to arbitration rulings in such cases.
The dissent added that the duty of fair representation would not provide adequate
protection for individuals since a decision made reasonably and in good faith would not violate
the duty even if the individual claim were meritorious.
In addition to joining Justice Souter’s dissent, Justice Stevens dissented separately.
C.

ANALYSIS

The 14 Penn Plaza decision significantly expands and limits important labor law
precedent. How it will be viewed in the future will depend in large part on how its principles are
applied in future cases.
The decision takes an expansive view of what constitutes a mandatory subject of
bargaining under the NLRA.306 The Court accepts what is far from clear under the words of the
statute or existing precedent—that the forum for resolution of individual employee statutory
claims against the employer is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Although there is no doubt
that this question is a “subject of interest” between the employer and the employees, it is unclear
that this is a subject amenable to resolution through collective bargaining, and there is certainly
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no significant history of resolving this issue through collective bargaining.307 Being designated a
mandatory subject of bargaining has a number of implications under labor law, and it is far from
clear that the Court has thought through all of these implications. Can an employer really
bargain with the union to impasse over this subject and then unilaterally change the terms of
employment to require the arbitration of individual statutory claims? Would that be a clear and
unmistakable waiver under Wright? This would seem particularly problematic, since by
unilaterally invoking arbitration, the employer would choose not only the forum but the
employee’s representative in any disputes—the union as exclusive representative. At the very
least it would have seemed more prudent for the Court to find such terms a permissive subject
rather than a mandatory subject.
If done in an even-handed fashion, broadening the definition of what constitutes a
mandatory subject of bargaining could provide some opportunities for unions. The employer is
the representative of the shareholders. Can the union bargain to impasse and/or strike to require
that the employer limit shareholder rights and interests that impact the employees, union, or
company? Can the union insist that managers accept arbitration as the forum for any future
disputes they have with the employees, union, or company, including specifying the system of
arbitration and remedies?
The decision also significantly limited Gardner-Denver as a precedent. Although it is
certainly true that Gardner-Denver is distinguishable on its facts, the Court’s opinion follows
Gilmer on the relative merits of arbitration and breaks down Gardner-Denver’s system of
allowing arbitration of contractual rights followed by the possible litigation of statutory rights.
In the short run, 14 Penn Plaza will have little impact in this regard, since few collective
bargaining agreements contain clauses expressly requiring the arbitration of individual legal
claims. However, it seems likely that employers will seek such clauses to limit employees to
“one bite at the apple” and to limit litigation expenses. Whether unions will be willing to
undertake the responsibility of litigating individual statutory claims is yet to be seen. It does not
seem that arbitrators are anxious to undertake such responsibilities. The National Academy of
Arbitrators filed an amicus brief in 14 Penn Plaza, arguing against committing statutory
discrimination claims “solely and exclusively” to the grievance and arbitration process.
The decision also leaves several important legal questions unanswered. For instance, the
Court did not expressly address the situation where a union blocks an employee from pursuing
arbitration by declining to arbitrate a discrimination claim. Under Kravar v. Triangle Services,
Inc.,308 a union’s decision to decline to pursue arbitration cannot be a bar to the employee’s
pursuit of individual claims under federal law. The Court also did not address the situation
where an employee’s original grievance alleges joint employer and union discrimination.
Individual employee claimants could argue that the 14 Penn Plaza holding does not extend to
those situations. Because of this possibility, it is difficult to predict how employers and unions
will respond to this decision.
See First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 673 n.10 (1981) (discussing
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There is pending legislation that could legislatively limit or overrule 14 Penn Plaza. The
Federal Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,309 which would invalidate pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration agreements with respect to employment claims, would seem the most logical vehicle,
but it currently invalidates only individual agreements to arbitrate and expressly exempts
collective bargaining agreements. Accordingly it would have to be amended to also invalidate
collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate individual statutory claims. The Employee Free
Choice Act310 would be another possible vehicle, or Congress might pass a special bill just to
overturn 14 Penn Plaza, along the lines of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.311 Given the
current political make-up of Congress, it seems likely that “remedial” legislation will be
introduced, but it would be perilous to predict that it would actually pass.
B.

ADEA
1.

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.312
A.

CASE BACKGROUND
(i.)

Issue and Context

The issue before the Court was whether a plaintiff in a non-Title VII discrimination case
must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction.
However, the Court addressed a different question: whether the burden of persuasion ever shifts
in mixed-motive cases under the ADEA.
Gross addressed an age discrimination claim brought under the ADEA. However,
petitioners and the lower courts relied on Title VII precedent in attempting to resolve the claim.
The Supreme Court had previously applied Title VII interpretations to ADEA cases,313 but the
precedent was unclear in its application to petitioner’s claim.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,314 the Court addressed the burden of persuasion in Title
VII mixed-motive cases. Price Waterhouse established that where plaintiffs show through direct
evidence that “discrimination was a ‘motivating’ or a ‘substantial’ factor in the employer’s
action, the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the
same action regardless of that impermissible consideration.”315
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In Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins,316 the Court held that a disparate treatment claim
under the ADEA is not cognizable unless “the employee’s protected trait actually played a role
in [the employer’s decision] . . . and had a determinative influence in the outcome.”317 The
Hazen Court relied on the text of the ADEA, which stated that an employer’s actions must be
“because of” an employee’s age. The Court did not address, however, whether the ADEA
allowed for a shift in the burden of persuasion to the employer or whether the ADEA demanded
that the plaintiff present direct evidence.
(ii.)

Facts

After working over thirty years at FBL Financial Services, Petitioner Gross had earned
the job of claims administration director. Two years later, FBL changed his job description and
assigned many of his responsibilities to a younger employee. Gross considered this reassignment
a demotion and filed suit in district court. He claimed that FBL violated the ADEA and
introduced evidence that his demotion was, at least in part, due to his age.318
(iii.)

Lower Courts

The district court gave the jury the following instructions: (1) it should find for Gross if
he proved age was a motivating factor in FBL’s decision; (2) it should find for FBL if it proved
that it would have demoted Gross regardless of his age. The jury found in favor of Gross. The
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred by giving
the jury the improper mixed-motive instruction.319 Relying on Price Waterhouse, the court of
appeals determined that the district court should not have given the jury a mixed-motive
instruction. Because Gross failed to present direct evidence that age was a motivating factor, the
court of appeals held that the burden should not have shifted to FBL to prove that it would have
made the same decision regardless of age.
B.

SUPREME COURT
(i.)

Decision and Holding

The Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit’s decision and held that the burden of
persuasion never shifts in ADEA mixed-motive cases.320 Instead, the Court articulated that it is
the burden of the plaintiff to establish that age was the “but for” cause of the employer’s actions.
The Court stated that Title VII cases do not control its analysis of discrimination cases
brought under the ADEA. This conclusion was based on the fact that the ADEA, unlike Title
VII, does not contain an express statutory provision that allows a plaintiff to establish
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discrimination by proving that discrimination was a motivating factor. The Court also relied
upon legislative history. When Congress amended both statutes in 1991, it added the relevant
provisions to Title VII but declined to add the same to the ADEA.321 Therefore, the Court
refused to use Title VII cases—like Price Waterhouse—in its analysis of an ADEA case.
The Court also grounded its decision in a textual analysis of the ADEA. The ADEA
states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”322 Applying
the ordinary meaning of “because of,” the Court interpreted the ADEA to mean that age must be
the reason that the employer acted.
This led the Court to conclude that “a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’
cause of the employer’s adverse decision” in order to establish a disparate treatment claim under
the ADEA.323 In other words, the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence (circumstantial or direct) that the employer would not have taken
the adverse action “but for” the employee’s age. The burden of persuasion never shifts to the
employer. Under this analysis, age must have been the determining factor in the employer’s
actions in order for a plaintiff to prove a violation under the ADEA.
(ii.)

Dissents

Justice Stevens argued in dissent that the Court should never ask whether a mixed-motive
jury instruction is appropriate in ADEA cases. He relied upon the Court’s interpretation of Title
VII’s language in Price Waterhouse—and Congress’ subsequent endorsement of that
interpretation—which determined that “because of” means that Title VII prohibits adverse
actions motivated in whole or in part by discrimination.324 According to Stevens, overturning the
Price Waterhouse rule was so far-reaching an argument that it should not have been heard unless
it were raised in the respondent’s opposition to a writ of certiorari.325 He also relied upon the
Court’s holding in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa to argue that courts resolving mixed-motive cases
under the ADEA should allow either circumstantial or direct evidence, rather than requiring
direct evidence. 326
Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that the Court’s “but for” standard was inappropriate in an
ADEA analysis.327 While this standard is acceptable in tort cases, it presents an obstacle too
difficult for employees to overcome in ADEA cases. Justice Breyer pointed out that employees
may be able to show that discrimination played a role in the employer’s decision, but employers
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are more likely to be in a position to know the employer’s mental state at the time of the adverse
action.
C.

ANALYSIS

In the wake of Gross, employers are in a better position to convince trial courts to dismiss
ADEA claims. The Court has significantly raised the bar for proving age discrimination in the
workplace by precluding ADEA plaintiffs from obtaining burden-shifting jury instructions from
trial courts. Instead, plaintiffs retain the burden of proving that an employer’s adverse action
actually occurred “because of” the plaintiff’s age.
This seems like a fairly activist reading for the conservative wing of the Court. It
rejected a reading of similar statutory language in Title VII that was previously made by a
majority of the Court and affirmed by Congress. The dissent called this “unnecessary
lawmaking.”328
The Court’s decision has a broad sweep for age and disability discrimination cases but—
given Congress’s amendments to Title VII following Price Waterhouse—it will probably have
little impact on Title VII cases. There is also a significant possibility that Congress will act to
legislatively overrule Gross by constructing a consistent procedure for handling mixed motive
cases across Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. Indeed, Senators Harkin and Leahy have
introduced a bill along these lines in the Senate and Representative Miller intends to do so in the
House.329
C

Title VII
1.

Ricci v. DeStefano330
A.

CASE BACKGROUND
(i.)

Issue

In Ricci, the Court addressed whether, and under what conditions, employers may engage
in intentional, race-conscious discrimination for purposes of avoiding or remedying a disparate
impact.
(ii.)

Facts of the Case

In 2003, the City of New Haven, Connecticut, contracted with Industrial/Organizational
Solutions, Inc. (IOS) to develop tests for promotions within its fire department. The Department
sought to fill both captain and lieutenant positions. The City and IOS developed the tests with
the aim of finding the most qualified applicants. They also developed the tests in light of the
328
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city’s obligations under federal and state law, the New Haven City Charter, and a collective
bargaining agreement.
The results of the tests showed a significant racial disparity. The pass rate of black
applicants was approximately half the rate for white applicants. The City Charter required the
city to comply with the “rule of three.” The “rule of three” required that city officials fill each
job vacancy from among only the top three scorers on the validated, job-related tests. If the city
certified the test results and complied with the “rule of three” requirement, no AfricanAmericans would have been eligible for any of the available lieutenant or captain positions.
Before the City selected anyone for promotion, an independent Civil Service Board (CSB)
needed to certify the results of the exam.
Given the racial disparity in the scores, the CSB held a number of public hearings aimed
at determining whether the tests were racially biased. Some of the more influential speakers at
the hearings included the city’s counsel, the director of the city’s Department of Human
Resources, an IOS employee who led the team responsible for developing the city’s tests, a
representative from an IOS competitor, and a number of firefighters. Notably, the city’s counsel
testified that, if the CSB decided to certify the test results, the city could be liable under Title
VII’s disparate-impact prohibition. After the hearings, the CSB split evenly on whether to
certify, and thus the results were not certified.
(iii.)

Lower Courts

Petitioners, a group of firefighters who scored highly on the tests, sued after the CSB
decided not to certify the examination results. They alleged that respondents violated, and
conspired to violate, the Equal Protection Clause. They also filed discrimination charges with the
EEOC, which issued right-to-sue letters. Before trial, petitioners amended their complaint to
include an allegation that the city violated Title VII’s disparate-treatment prohibition.
Respondents’ defense was that “they had a good faith belief that they would have violated the
disparate-impact prohibition in Title VII . . . had they certified the examination results.”331
In the district court, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the court
granted respondents’ motion. On the Constitutional question, the court held that respondents had
not violated the Equal Protection Clause, because their actions were not “based on race.”332 On
the statutory question, the court held that employers need not “certify a test where they cannot
pinpoint its deficiency explaining its disparate impact . . . simply because they have not yet
formulated a better selection method.”333
In a one-paragraph opinion adopting the reasoning of the district court, a three-judge
panel of the Second Circuit affirmed.334 The court first decided the case in an unpublished
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summary order, and then later replaced that with a “nearly identical” per curiam opinion.335 As
discussed in the introduction to this Article, this Second Circuit panel included then-Circuit
Judge Sonia Sotomayor. The Second Circuit thereafter “voted 7 to 6 to deny rehearing en banc,
over written dissents” by two judges.336
B.

SUPREME COURT
(i.)

Holdings of the Court

The Court deemed it necessary to return to “the important purpose of Title VII—that the
workplace be an environment free of discrimination, where race is not a barrier to
opportunity.”337 The Court started from the premise that respondents’ decision to discard the test
results violated Title VII’s disparate-treatment prohibition “absent some valid defense.”338 In
other words, the court assumed discriminatory conduct and only addressed the issue of whether
the city’s decision relied on “a lawful justification for . . . race-based action.”339
Petitioners argued that “under Title VII, avoiding unintentional discrimination cannot
justify intentional discrimination.”340 They alternatively suggested that the only way an
employer could rely upon good-faith compliance as a defense against disparate treatment was if
the employer were “in fact . . . in violation of the disparate-impact provision.”341
The Court found petitioners’ arguments “overly simplistic and too restrictive of Title
VII’s purpose.”342 First, petitioners “ignore[d] the fact that . . . Congress has expressly
prohibited both types of discrimination.”343 Second, it is well established “that ‘voluntary
compliance’ [is] ‘the preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII.’”344
Respondents “assert[ed] that an employer’s good-faith belief that its actions are necessary
to comply with Title VII’s disparate-impact provision should be enough to justify race-conscious
conduct.”345 The Court found that this argument contradicts the purpose of Title VII. It saw
such an approach as “encourag[ing] race-based action at the slightest hint of disparate impact,”
and “amount[ing] to a de facto quota system in which a ‘focus on statistics . . . could put undue
pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures.’”346 This result would be
contrary to Title VII, which “is express in disclaiming any interpretation of its requirements as
335
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calling for outright racial balancing.”347 The Court also found that respondents’ argument
contradicts the language of the statute. “[W]hen Congress codified the disparate-impact
provision in 1991, it made no exception to disparate-treatment liability for actions taken in a
good-faith effort to comply with the new, disparate-impact provision in subsection (k).”348
(ii.)

Decision and Holding

The Court decided the case solely on the basis that the city violated Title VII. It did not
reach the constitutional issue. It reversed the Second Circuit and remanded the case with
instructions that “summary judgment [was] appropriate for petitioners on their disparatetreatment claim.”349
In Ricci, the Court attempted to resolve the “competing expectations” faced by employers
under Title VII’s disparate treatment and disparate impact prohibitions.350 The disparatetreatment provision prohibits employers from “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”351 The disparate-impact provision prohibits employers
from engaging in “a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”352
Recognizing that “these two prohibitions could be in conflict absent a rule to reconcile
them,” the Court sought “to provide guidance to employers and courts” about how to avoid or
impose liability.353 Specifically, it addressed whether an employer may be excused from
disparate-treatment discrimination if its purpose is to avoid liability for disparate-impact
discrimination. The Court’s guidance came in the form of a new rule—the “strong basis in
evidence” standard—imported from constitutional jurisprudence. It held “that, under Title VII,
before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding
or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in
evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the raceconscious, discriminatory action.”354
(iii.)

The Role of Pretext and Justice Alito’s “Subjective Question”

Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justice
Alito noted that the majority’s analysis was confined to the “objective question” of “whether the
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reason given by the employer is one that is legitimate under Title VII.”355 The Court answered
this question by applying the “strong basis in evidence” standard in determining the legitimacy
of the employer’s actions and reasons. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent that argued that the
proper objective standard should be “good cause.”356 Justice Alito disagreed. He pointed out that
Title VII requires a second step: a “subjective question” about whether “the employer’s intent . .
. was just a pretext for discrimination.”357 In this case, Justice Alito found that respondents
would have failed the subjective part of the inquiry, even if they passed the first. He stated that
“a reasonable jury could easily find that the City’s real reason for scrapping the test results was
not a concern about violating the disparate-impact provision of Title VII but a simple desire to
please a politically important racial constituency.”358 Because of the Alito concurrence, this
second subjective question of whether the employer’s stated intent was simply a pretext for
discrimination remains part of Title VII analysis.
(iv.)

Justice Ginsburg’s “Good Cause” Standard

Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion offered a standard alternative to the majority’s
“strong basis in evidence” test. She wrote that an employer should be able to avoid disparatetreatment liability as long as it has “good cause to believe the [selection] device would not
withstand examination for business necessity.”359 As applied to this case, Justice Ginsburg
concluded that the city would have met this standard, because “the record solidly establishes that
the city had good cause to fear disparate-impact liability.”360 In support of this conclusion, she
pointed to the “significant doubts” raised about the legitimacy of the tests, and the “better, less
discriminatory selection methods” the city became aware of during the CSB hearings.361
Justice Ginsburg arrived at this “good cause” standard by examining the factual and legal
context surrounding both this case and Title VII’s disparate-impact doctrine. The discussion of
factual context focused on the long history of unequal opportunity and racial discrimination in
the New Haven fire department. Justice Ginsburg claimed that the majority’s treatment of the
facts ignored this “backdrop of entrenched inequality.”362 The discussion of legal context
focused on the Court’s holding in Griggs v. Duke Power Company,363 “which explained the
centrality of the disparate-impact concept to effective enforcement of Title VII,”364 as well as the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, in which “Congress formally codified the disparate-impact component
of Title VII.”365
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Justice Ginsburg argued that, given this context, a proper reading of Title VII must view
the “disparate-treatment and disparate-impact proscriptions . . . as complementary.”366 It viewed
“these twin pillars of Title VII” as “[s]tanding on equal footing” and “advanc[ing] the same
objectives.”367 Based on this interpretation, the majority’s position—that the two proscriptions
are often in conflict with each other—“shows little attention to Congress’ design or to the Griggs
line of cases Congress recognized as pathmarking.”368
Not surprisingly, the dissent describes the majority’s “strong basis in evidence” standard
as “enigmatic” and “not elaborated.”369 The majority’s reliance on “inapposite” equal protection
precedent was deemed “of limited utility,” mainly because the Equal Protection Clause is only
concerned with intentional—rather than disparate-impact—discrimination.370 Furthermore,
Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority’s standard “makes voluntary compliance [with Title
VII] a hazardous venture.”371
C.

ANALYSIS

Perhaps the central implication of the Court’s decision is that employers should address
concerns about the disparate impact of an employment test before the test is administered, not
after the results are known. The Court still supports the use of employer-created tests and stated
that testing “can be an important part of a neutral selection system that safeguards against the
very racial animosities Title VII was intended to prevent.”372 However, the Court added an
additional burden on employers seeking to use tests. This burden now falls primarily in properly
designing employment tests and criteria. The Court did not imply that the “strong basis in
evidence” standard applies to the designing of tests. However, the Court did provide guidance
for employers seeking to avoid disparate-impact liability. It expressly stated that “Title VII does
not prohibit an employer from considering, before administering a test or practice, how to design
that test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their
race.”373
The same requirements would seem to apply to an employer that created and
administered a test, and only later decided how to use it. Under these circumstances, Ricci
would allow an employer to tweak the way it weighted its scores and criteria, as long as these
efforts were applied to future administration of the test. If the employer sought to apply any
changes to tests that had already been administered, and these changes were racially motivated,
then the employer would have to justify its measures by showing through a “strong basis in
evidence” that the changes were necessary to avoid disparate-impact liability. This result is

366

Id. at 2699.
Id.
368
Id.
369
Id. at 2700.
370
Id.
371
Id. at 2701.
372
Id. at 2676.
373
Id. at 2677.
367

46

consistent with the Court’s statements about tests being administered in a way that meets
legitimate employee expectations.374
Although the Court purports to support employment testing, it may be that one of the
results of the Ricci decision is that there will be less testing. In navigating the Scylla of disparate
treatment liability and the Charybdis of disparate impact, employers may follow Aeneas’ lead
and avoid these waters altogether.375 Rather than test, the employer could rely on less objective
procedures such as interviews and evaluations by supervisors to make decisions that achieve
employment objectives with less risk of litigation. Such a change could place more discretion in
the hands of supervisors; whether one believes this would be a positive or negative development
in achieving the objectives of Title VII probably depends on what one thinks of the supervisors
making such decisions. It would be ironic if employment tests adopted at least in part to provide
objective criteria and some protection from discrimination for racial minorities were now
abandoned because subjective criteria offered those workers better prospects.
The Court’s opinion makes it clear that its standard in accommodating disparate impact
and disparate treatment concerns cuts both ways. The facts of Ricci required the Court to
address how the “strong basis in evidence” standard can guide employers that seek to avoid
disparate-impact liability by engaging in practices that would otherwise violate Title VII’s
disparate-treatment prohibition. However, the Court noted that the standard can cut in the
opposite direction as well: “In light of our holding today it should be clear that the City would
avoid disparate-impact liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not certified the
results, it would have been subject to disparate-treatment liability.”376
In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito went to some pain to make the point that
subjective intent still plays a role in disparate treatment litigation. He noted that the majority’s
analysis was confined to the “objective question” of “whether the reason given by the employer
is one that is legitimate under Title VII.”377 Justice Alito pointed out that there is a second,
necessary step under Title VII: a “subjective question” regarding whether “the employer’s intent
. . . was just a pretext for discrimination.”378 In this case, Justice Alito found that respondents
would have failed the subjective part of the inquiry, even if they passed the first. He stated that
“a reasonable jury could easily find that the City’s real reason for scrapping the test results was
not a concern about violating the disparate-impact provision of Title VII but a simple desire to
please a politically important racial constituency.”379 In short, pretext is still a component of
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Title VII analysis in conflicting-prohibition cases. Therefore, an employer’s defense of goodfaith compliance may require more than what the majority explained in its decision.
Justice Scalia used his concurring opinion to raise the specter that disparate treatment
analysis under Title VII may be unconstitutional. According to Justice Scalia, the majority’s
“resolution of this dispute merely postpones the ‘evil day’ on which the Court will have to
confront the question” concerning the constitutionality of the disparate-impact provision.380 The
Court concluded that it “need not reach the question whether Respondents’ actions may have
violated the Equal Protection Clause.”381 This left big questions about the future of Title VII’s
disparate impact prohibition. For instance, though the Court avoided deciding “whether a
legitimate fear of disparate impact is ever sufficient to justify discriminatory treatment under the
Constitution,” it inferred that the strong basis in evidence standard may not “satisfy the Equal
Protection Clause in a future case.”382
The question is whether Justice Scalia will be able to find four other Justices on the
current Court who agree that the disparate treatment doctrine is unconstitutional. It is worth
noting that the Court imported the strong basis in evidence standard from “cases discussing
constitutional principles.”383 Stating that it had “considered cases similar to this one . . . in the
context of the Equal Protection Clause,” the Court found those cases sufficiently analogous to
provide a “helpful guidance.”384 It cited Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company385 and Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education386 for the principle that “government actions to remedy past racial
discrimination—actions that are themselves based on race—are constitutional only where there
is a ‘strong basis in evidence’ that the remedial actions were necessary.”387 By reliance on
constitutional precedent to bolster the disparate impact doctrine, the Court may be hinting at its
unwillingness to hold the disparate impact provision unconstitutional.
IV.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court continued its starboard tack in the 2008–2009 Term, and the labor
and employment law decisions proved no exception to this trend. In sixty-nine percent of the
“close cases” in which the Justices divided 5–4 along ideological lines, including all three such
cases in labor and employment law, the conservative wing of the Court, made up of Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, prevailed. Indeed, the conservative wing of the
Court voted in the majority in all of the labor and employment law cases this Term. Justice
Kennedy continued to be the “man in the middle” with his vote deciding seventy-eight percent of
the 5–4 decisions and all of the 5–4 labor and employment law decisions in the Term. Justice
Kennedy voted with the conservative wing in the sixty-nine percent of the “close cases” it won
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this year, including all of the labor and employment law cases. Justice Kennedy voted in the
majority in ninety-two percent of the Term’s cases, far more than any other justice. The
replacement of Justice Souter by Justice Sotomayor is not likely to change the underlying politics
of the Court.
Three closely decided labor and employment law cases stand out from among the
decisions of the Term. In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,388 the Court announced that it would
enforce a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires individual
employees to arbitrate claimed violations of the ADEA. This decision used an expansive
definition of what constitutes a “mandatory subject of bargaining” and limited the Court’s prior
precedent in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. It is not clear that the parties will embrace this
decision or that Congress will leave it undisturbed.
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,389 the Court held that the burden of proof never
shifts from plaintiff to employer in a mixed-motive discrimination case under the ADEA and,
furthermore, that in order for a plaintiff to prove discrimination under the ADEA it must show
that age was a “but for” factor in the employer’s decision to take adverse action. This decision
ignores the Court’s contrary prior interpretation of Title VII and invites legislative intervention.
Finally in Ricci v. DeStefano,390 the Court held that under Title VII, an employer is
required to have a “strong basis in evidence” of potential disparate-impact liability before the
employer can engage in intentional, race-conscious discrimination for the purpose of avoiding or
remedying a disparate impact. This decision makes it clear that employers should address
potential disparate treatment issues in the design of employment tests before the tests are
administered, not based on differential results. The decision may have a modest impact on the
use of employment tests and promote a move to more subjective methods of evaluation that are
less subject to later legal scrutiny. All three of these cases followed the pattern of a 5–4 decision
in which Justice Kennedy voted with the conservative wing of the Court to give them a victory.
This pattern of voting was well established in the labor and employment law cases of the 2008–
2009 Term with Justice Kennedy voting with the conservative wing of the Court in all cases.
Any attorney who represents unions or employees should think twice about whether he or she
can gain Justice Kennedy’s vote before appealing any decision to the Supreme Court.
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